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Negative Theory
Existing economic and financial theories of nonprofit organizations are based in an
extensive and rather remarkable set of negations and negative comparisons of voluntary
action with the market, or for-profit sector. Ironically, these negations tell us far more
about what the nonprofit sector is not than they do about what it is. They also begin rather
consistently from the charming, but completely unwarranted, assumption that all nonprofit
activity is somehow a deviant form of commercial enterprise. As a result, the professed
intent of recent nonprofit economic theory to be useful to those with a substantive interest
in voluntary action (Rose-Ackerman, p.15) falls far short of the mark. The intent of this
article is to stimulate further debate among market-oriented economists, voluntary sector
management theorists and others over more appropriate models of resource allocation and
decision-making in the voluntary sector. A suitable beginning point for this discussion is
the remarkably negative tone of existing nonprofit economics, and associated work in
accounting and management science.
Anthony and Young define a nonprofit organization as one "whose goal is something
other than earning a profit for its owners". They also identify the absence of a profit
measure and inadequate management controls among a list of characteristics which
identify nonprofit organizations. (1984, p. 38) Anthony and Young, along with many others
also view nonprofit organization as inherently inefficient due to the lack of profit
motivation and resulting inadequate management controls. (Anthony and Young,1984;
Steinberg, 1987, p. 134; Zaltman, 1979). Hansmann finds the basis of an economic model of
nonprofit action in a phenomenon he terms contract failure (1980, 1987). Baumol and
Bowen (1966) argue that the performing arts face an ever widening income-earnings gap
because of their inability to increase productivity via technological change (1968). Sugden
argues that "the voluntary sector differs from the profit-making sector in that exclusion is
not practiced....(because) a person has contributed towards the costs (of a nonprofit
service) does not give him any entitlement or priority" (1984, p. 772). Weisbrod (1977)
places the negative accent not in the nonprofit sector itself, but in the public sector.
Nonprofit action, he argues, tends to serve a gap-filling role vis-à-vis governmental
enterprise, meeting demands for public services left unmet by government provision. The
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first two sections of a recent book on nonprofit economics are entitled "Government
Failure" and "Contract Failure" (Rose-Ackerman, 1986). Others have suggested that such
organizations are non-governmental in nature.
Virtually all existing nonprofit management theories explicitly or implicitly begin from
this kind of negative accent and contribute to the paradoxical consensus position that
nonprofits action has no independent basis. Nonprofit organizations (and voluntary action)
arise only from the failures of other institutions, but are themselves inefficient,
unproductive, poorly managed, mismanaged and inadequately controlled. The resulting
stigmatization of nonprofit and voluntary action – widely shared among American business
and political leaders for much of this century – has many far-reaching policy consequences,
including some distinctly quirky conclusions. For example, in the current Small Business
Administration campaign against nonprofits, the tax-exempt status of nonprofit
organizations is being challenged on grounds that nonprofits have "an unfair competitive
advantage." (Washington Social Legislation Bulletin, 1985.) Unfair competition, it would
seem arising from inefficient, unproductive, poorly managed sources!
The remarkable negative (and paradoxical) accent of literature concentrating on the
economics and management of nonprofits is in marked contrast to the positive statements
of most other, noneconomic, sources dealing with the voluntary sector. Philanthropy is a
tradition reaching back millennia to the ancient Greeks. In another historical perspective
on nonprofit activity, Hall identifies the nonprofit sector as a distinctive product of
democracy and capitalism. (Hall, 1987,3). In a political analysis of nonprofits, Douglas
(1987, 47) notes that "the classic pluralist argument is that a voluntary nonprofit sector
permits a greater diversity of social provisions than the state itself can provide." Simon
(1987, 68) in reviewing the legal issues of tax-exempt status, says that "the nonprofit sector
is subject to special treatment under federal individual and corporate income taxes, estate
and gift taxes and certain excise taxes." Each of these authors, like the majority of the forty
five articles in the O'Connell (1983) volume are saying positive things about the social,
economic and legal posture of nonprofit organizations without any overtones of failure,
incompleteness, mismanagement and inadequacy which characterize the economic
literature.
An important question which arises, therefore, is why the economic treatment of
voluntary action is so uniformly and distinctly negative. One possibility, of course, would be
simply to point to a theoretical bias against nonprofit action by economists, accountants,
management scientists and business leaders – a simple preference for market and profitoriented activity or a distaste for nonprofit and philanthropic ventures. Such a possibility
should not be easily discounted. In general, however, negation does not offer a sound
starting point for theory and scientific study of nonprofit organization and voluntary
action.

A Classification Anomaly
An equally plausible explanation is that all this negativism results from the failure of
existing economic theory to adequately explain noncommercial and nongovernmental
voluntary action. The very concept of 'nonprofit' (or 'not-for-profit') activity as a unit of
analysis may well be a classification anomaly resulting from the observable existence of
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actual, empirical voluntary action outside the range of concepts covered by existing
economic and financial theories. Thus, the term nonprofit functions as a linguistic marker
for various rhetorical extensions and clever analogies with which to bring these
phenomena back within theoretical range of established economic theory. Such restoration
efforts, while interesting from the vantage point of existing theory, do remarkably little to
adequately describe or explain the basis of rational choice in voluntary action. While
various reasons have been advanced for this, one very real possibility is that existing
economic concepts are insufficient to the task, thus necessitating those remarkable
negations. We can produce roughly the same result by classifying lettuce as a mammal.
Lettuce, by this logic, is a non-fur bearing, non-milk producing, non-child bearing, nonwarm-blooded non-animal. Further, as a mammal, lettuce is highly ineffective, being
sedentary and not warm-blooded. All other mammals are much faster! Lettuce is also
remarkable nonagile, and not protective of its young. On the whole, lettuce is a miserable
excuse for a mammal!
In a similar way, nonprofit action has increasingly been misclassified as a very deficient
form of commercial enterprise. The full burden of this classification anomaly forces us to
equate formally organized nonprofit services for the homeless, community orchestras or
intercollegiate lacrosse and rugby competitions with completely unrelated commercial
ventures like manufacturing shoes or selling automobiles. In the process, the very nature of
nonprofit action is transformed and distorted solely in order to make it more easily fit
existing theory.
Finding reasons for this misclassification is not difficult. First of all, some types of
contemporary American 'nonprofit' services do look and act a good deal like commercial
ventures, and the current trend appears to be for some of them to move even further in
that direction in the future. Because there is a marked tendency in current nonprofit
economics to concentrate on hospitals, nursing homes, fee-based social services and other
quasi-commercial enterprises, this perspective is easily sustained. We are in danger of
forgetting, however, that a very large portion of voluntary action does not look or act
anything like commercial enterprise, and nonprofit economics has been virtually mute on
these efforts.
Clues that nonprofit organizations are actually of at least two basic types are scattered
throughout the existing literature. Hansmann, for example, differentiates mutual,
entrepreneurial, donative and commercial types. (Hansmann, 1980) In a similar vein,
Anthony distinguishes between "Type A" nonprofits which rely on revenues (Hansmann’s
entrepreneurial and commercial types), and "Type B" nonprofits (the mutual and donative
types) which do not (Anthony, 1978, 8-10). We can label the first of these nonprofit firms.
Mutual and donative nonprofits will receive further attention below. In the remainder of
this discussion, we will be concerned entirely with noncommercial and nonentrepreneurial
nonprofit activities (Hansman's donative-mutual cell and Anthony's Type B). For reasons of
parsimony, we can call Type B, donative-mutual economic action "voluntary action".
There is good reason within economic theory itself for believing that voluntary action
falls outside conventional economic theory: In one of the fundamental formative
documents of economic theory, for example, Adam Smith classified many common
activities which we today call voluntary as "unproductive" and set them entirely, and
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perhaps permanently, outside the bounds of economics. For most of the next two centuries,
Smith’s concept resulted in economists viewing such activities as consumption rather than
productive activity.
The theoretical basis of such perspectives is itself one more negation: Smith's concept
of 'unproductive labor'. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith argued that: "There is one sort of
labor which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed; there is another
which has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, may be called productive; the
latter, unproductive labor. Thus the labor of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of
the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master's profit.
The labor of a menial servant, on the contrary adds to the value of nothing. Though the
manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he, in reality, costs him no
expense, the value of his wages generally being restored, together with a profit, in the
improved value of the subject upon which the labor was bestowed. A man grows rich by
employing a multitude of manufacturers; he grows poor by maintaining a multitude of
menial servants." (p. 430)
Mainstream economics continued to hold to Smith’s position for most of the next two
centuries. Neoclassical economic theorists eventually rejected Smith’s concept of
unproductive labor and nonprofit economists are in the process of identifying distinctive
models of nonprofit organization as production. Nonetheless, calling attention to Smith’s
concept is important both because of its long duration and because of its apparent role in
making the case for state nonprofit corporation statutes and in the computation of the
national accounts: Nonprofit corporations were held to be tax-exempt because their
activities represented consumption rather than production.
For decades, the U.S. Department of Commerce classified trackable nonprofit activity as
consumption in the national accounts, and acknowledged that many other types of
voluntary action (especially those under consideration here) are not measured in national
income (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1981). The view that voluntary action consumes rather
than creates economic value was reinforced when Smith noted, "Unproductive laborers,
and those who do not labour at all, are all maintained by revenue; either, first, by that part
of the annual produce which is originally destined for constituting a revenue to some
particular persons, either as the rent of land or as the profits of stock; or secondly, by that
part which, though originally destined for replacing a capital and for maintaining
productive labourers only, yet when it comes into their hands whatever part of it is over
and above their necessary subsistence may be employed indifferently in maintaining either
productive or unproductive hands." (p. 432) Elsewhere, Smith notes, voluntary action was
deemed to be most like household service.
The entire economics of common goods is subsumed within that part which is "over
and above" subsistence and a matter of indifference. The indifference of economic theory is
well documented. A brief check on the economic theory shelves in any library will confirm
that terms such as nonprofit, voluntary, gifts, charity, philanthropy and even services occur
rarely and peripherally in economic theory texts. Voluntary action, it would seem, was
written out of the economic corpus at the beginning, and has, at best, only recently sneaked
back into the farthest, least well lit, corners. And, perhaps as a price for readmission, the
main body of voluntary action has remained beyond the analytical limits of economic
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theory. Highly visible and costly "nonprofit" activities, such as large scale health care
services and "big time" intercollegiate football and basketball, do not constitute the core of
America’s voluntary sector, but rather constitute a kind of hybrid activity, operating on the
margins of the marketplace. The core of voluntary action is to be found in the myriad
activities of religious, philosophical and scientific, charitable, artistic and athletic
associations whose members act jointly without consideration of personal or collective
profit in any economically meaningful sense. Most such activity is not monetized. One
essential task of a "nonprofit" economics of voluntary action, or common goods economics,
should be to account for these core activities.
Important questions can be raised about whether such an economics of voluntary
action is even possible. Smith appeared to believe not. Yet, if by economics one means
formal and logical analysis of rational collective action, certainly the answer would appear
to be yes. If, by economics one means the wholesale application of abstract mathematical
equations and models to empirical problems encountered in voluntary action situations,
based on rather loose analogies and metaphors, the answer certainly appears to be yes. If,
however, one seeks after fundamental and consistent explanations of rational allocative
choice in voluntary action, or the contribution of voluntary action to the national wealth,
the picture is considerably less clear. The technology of contemporary economic analysis is
very powerful. Whether the results of those applications have any meaning except as
logical exercises, however, is another question entirely.
Equally unclear is whether a “nonprofit economics” of voluntary action must be
grounded in philosophical utilitarianism and specifically the concept of utility. It would
appear that distinct economic criteria may be implicit in virtually every major philosophy,
belief system, scientific discipline or other "thought system" and way of life represented in
the nonprofit world. These would seem to represent alternative evaluative systems, at least
as well-grounded as the utilitarian concepts of economic theory. There is nothing especially
rational about the value commitment that adherents of diverse schools of thought must
adhere to the logic and standards of 19th century English utilitarians as the price of access
to and use of economic resources in what are otherwise considered free, unconstrained
and self-governing institutions. The preferred approach of a genuine nonprofit economics
should allow for the intrinsic establishment of group standards or "minimally satisfactory
alternatives" rather than the universal imposition of utility maximization as a universal
criterion.
Viewed in this way, there is something decidedly ironic, if not downright disingenuous,
about the negations of nonprofit theory. Charges of inefficiency and lack of productivity
seem particularly ironic, given the traditional placement of many types of nonprofits
entirely outside the bounds of economic production.

Toward Positive Theory: An Alternative Approach
The main thrust of this article is devoted to a number of speculative comments about
the nature of a new economics of voluntary action, with particular emphasis on "Type B"
mutual and donative associations, societies, congregations, groups and other similar forms
of collectivities. What follows is an effort to address in an affirmative manner such
questions as: What is the nature of economic action "outside" the market, the household
5

and the state? (It has already been established what it is not.) What is that something other
than earning a profit which energizes those who operate in the voluntary sector or
commons? Are there any recognizable rational economic criteria employed by voluntary
sector actors who frankly acknowledge the absence or inappropriateness of measures such
as profit maximization, Pareto optimality and efficiency? The perspective set forth here is
termed common goods economics, or endowment theory. It is deeply grounded in
philosophical pragmatism and sociological interactionism: The writings of C.S. Pierce, W.
James, J. Dewey, G.H. Mead, W.I. Thomas, H. Blumer, K. Burke, H.S. Sullivan, et. al., have
contributed importantly to it. However, none of these sources ever attempted, or so far as
is known, contemplated an economics of voluntary action. Thus, rather than clutter the text
with additional references to works which are discussed in standard social theory texts, the
interested reader unfamiliar with these authors should consult such texts. Martindale
(1960) is still an excellent introduction to most of the relevant issues, despite its age.

An Economics of Common Goods
The first task must be to establish some suitable nomenclature. As a fundamental term,
nonprofit is inadequate, although not noticeably more so than such old saws as "charity",
"philanthropy" or even "eleemosynary". In the following discussion, the term commons will
be used to signify the economic dimensions of a large and diverse set of voluntary
collective action by service clubs, artistic, scientific and amateur athletic societies, social
and political movements, religious and philosophical groups, and others which form the
core of the voluntary sector in American and other cultures.
In all known human cultures, self-defining and self-governing collectivities of
voluntarily associating individuals operate collectively and independently outside of
markets, households and the state in social spaces which can be called commons. There
they pursue mutually agreed-upon purposes along joint lines of action and on the basis of
economic criteria unique and intrinsic to the commons. From an economic perspective and
regardless of whether they can be monetized, those mutual purposes constitute common
goods. An economic common and associated common goods arise whenever an association
or group is formed or an assembly is gather together, simply because it is a virtual
impossibility that any collective action can or will occur without resort to money or other
economic resources. Commons are not unique to American culture or the present century,
although they probably exist in relatively greater abundance today than at other times in
history, due both to the combined effects of economic affluence and political freedom. A
number of commons, including Plato's Academy and the other Athenian philosophy
schools, the Oracle at Delphi, the Temple at Jerusalem, the Library of Alexandria, the great
medieval monasteries, universities and hospitals have played critical roles in the
preservation and advancement of Western civilization and values.
Similarly important nonwestern commons can also be identified, which perform
analogous roles in other cultures, including along with hundreds of other possible
examples, Islamic mosques and charitable institutions of zakat, Indian ashrams, Hindu and
Buddhist temples, Central American Fiestas and various practices of folk medicine
throughout the world. In the time since this article was first published, the temple complex
at Gobeckli Tepi in Turkey, built nearly 11,000 years ago, appears to be the world’s oldest
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example of such a common. James (1987) is one of the few attempts in the economic
literature to encompass such diverse phenomena within the traditional production
metaphor.
The economic objective and result of collective action in commons is the production of
common goods, which may include such things as new knowledge, religious worship,
contemplation, scientific inquiry, helping and charity, artistic expression, play and many
other desirable projects of voluntary action groups. Such common goods are easily and
readily distinguished both from market commodities and public goods. Exclusion is often
possible with common goods, and they are, therefore, unlike public goods. However, since
both the costs and benefits of common goods accrue to pluralities without division, they
are not private goods either. Further, because they do not involve large numbers of buyers
and sellers and any known or recognizable price mechanism, they cannot be considered
market goods without resort to extraordinary theoretical devices or deus ex machina.
Figure 1 below is an adaptation by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom (1978) of the conventional
economic distinctions of public and private goods, differentiated by the characteristics of
exclusion and what they call “subtractability”. It is hypothesized here that what the
Ostroms call common goods corresponds closely with what Anthony labeled Type B
nonprofits and Hansmann’s donative and mutual types and what they call toll goods
correspond with Anthony’s Type A nonprofits and Hansmann’s entrepreneurial and
commercial nonprofits.

Figure 1
Public, Private, Toll and Common Goods
Subtractability
Exclusion

Low
Public Goods
Toll Goods

Easy
Difficult

High
Common Goods
Private Goods
Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977.

Common goods and toll goods are best viewed as entirely separate categories of
economic goods, each with their own unique characteristics. One of the most intriguing
traits of common goods, for example, is the two-way transformation of economic values
(money and commodities) into non-economic values (religious, philosophical, scientific,
artistic, charitable, meanings) and back again. This process is frequently mislabeled
"nonprofit production" in contemporary theory, but bears little economic similarity to the
economic production of toll goods for fee-paying health and human services clients.
Perhaps the most universal, clearly observable and easily understandable case of this
involves the transformation of gold, other precious metals and gems and even ordinary
objects into religious icons and sacred objects. Such objects can be transformed back into
marketable commodities but only by destroying their value as common goods. In some
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cases, the "consumption", or extinction of economic value which occurs is complete, as in
the burning of incense. Such transformations are often reversable, however, as conquerors
and ordinary thieves throughout the ages have proven by restoring the market value to
these objects. The 20th century marketization of religious art from many cultures offers
one of the less destructive forms of such reversal, as "priceless" masterpieces are, in fact,
priced and sold at auction. In late 1988, for example, Hereford Cathedral in England was
reported to be considering the sale of a "priceless" medieval artifact, de Mappa Munde, to
finance cathedral operations. A huge public outcry eventually brought substantial
donations and the proposed sale was withdrawn and the non-economic value of the map as
a common good was retained.
As in this case, such transformations are not the central economic facts of the commons,
but only to the interaction of commons and markets. The central economic facts of the
commons are episodes of communicative interaction. The reason this is so is quite simple:
Services are primarily social acts and not physical objects. Those philosophers and social
scientists who have studied acts generally agree that such acts involve communication.
This is one of the key departures of twentieth century American social science from
nineteenth century materialism, and one to which an economics of voluntary action must
accommodate.
Although there is no fully satisfactory term for the economic aspects of this
communication process we might refer to it as discretion (as in "discretionary grants" or
"discretionary purchases"). In any case, discretion may be the preferable term when
addressing the choice and decision aspects of acts of common good. For a host of
theoretical and practical reasons, the term coproduction
In the 1989 version of this article the conventional term rendition was put forward.
Unfortunately, in the period after publication of the first edition of this article, the term
rendition took on tragic connotations of political torture and has been dropped from
further consideration. Some sources refer to the process as "prosumption". Meanwhile,
Benkler’s provocative analysis of peer production, a.k.a. coproduction, in the voluntary
action of software production suggests this as a plausible term (which covers both
"services" and "service delivery" in the elementary, basic social acts of producing common
goods (Benkler, 2002; Benkler, 2006). Coproduction of common goods is, upon close
examination, quite distinct from economic production, including the production of toll
goods. In fact, coproduction involves a process of simultaneous "production" and
"consumption". It is also a central fact of common goods production that they cannot be
inventoried, warehoused or arbitraged, for the simple reason that their "production" and
"consumption" are not only collective and social but also simultaneous.
Diverse economic and noneconomic sources working in the theoretical no-man’s land of
common goods have struggled with the resultant inapplicability of economic dualisms like
production and consumption to social action. Eagleton (1976), for example, speaks of
"Literary value is a phenomenon which is produced (as opposed to immanent) in . . . that
"consumptional production" of the work which is the act of reading." p. 166-167. A recent
trend has been to speak of the "coproduction" of common goods. (Austin, 1981) Overall, it
seems preferable to abandon the dualistic language of production entirely.
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Coproduction of common goods is, upon close examination, quite distinct from
economic production of toll goods, private goods and public goods. In particular, it involves
symbolic processes which blend information and meaning--neither of which adheres to
ordinary economic assumptions of scarcity. (Ilchman and Uphoff, 1968) While the terms
information and meaning are often used interchangeably, it is more useful for our purposes
to distinguish them as economic commodities. In this, we follow Edelman (1971) and Moles
(1968), who have made a clear distinction between them. Information involves
communication of novelty, freshness, spontaneity and unpredictability in discretionary
situations. When an astrophysicist searching for the edge of the universe makes a
discovery, or when a performer offers a new interpretation of a familiar work of art, or a
social worker begins working with a new client, the research finding, the presentation and
the new case are heavily informational. In the same vein, the perspective offered here will,
it is hoped, be informative for readers. By contrast, meaning addresses the certainty, order,
redundancy and predictability of communication. New research findings must be placed in
the context of previous research to be understood. Likewise, the artistic presentation is
judged against previous interpretations and the dramatic script or musical score, and client
problems are interpreted within a body of established practice theory. Meaning used in this
way comes close to what philosophers of science address as a paradigm. (Bernstein, 1985)
Because they consist of information and meaning, common goods are symbolic and not
subject to either economic scarcity or physical laws. Furthermore, the peculiar
consumption (or extinction of value) associated with acts of coproduction is never entirely
complete because of memories, notes, written accounts and artifacts and other meanings.
Any fund of surviving meanings and new information which functions as a resource for
further voluntary action will be termed an endowment. Thus, for example, the pioneering
social workers, doctors, nurses and others who built up an initial knowledge base out of
their practical experience in the early days of the HIV-AIDS crisis in the 1980s were able to
pass that endowment on to others, and supplement their own experience with research
results as they were published. The economics of commons treats money as a symbolic
medium, along with other resource endowments. Money is, however, only one of the media
of the commons. One process with important consequences for the economic value of an
endowment in the commons involves the process we call learning, the economic
importance of which involves taking value away from a situation. The complementary
process to learning is technique, which is one of two forms of bringing value into a
situation. An accumulated set of learned techniques possessed by a person or a group is a
special set of meanings which can be termed a repertory. Thus, founding a musical or
theatre group, for example often hinges on identifying seasoned performers with an
established repertory (of both written scripts and acting techniques) able to act upon and
to teach others. The same can also be said for a monastic order, an athletic team, a research
laboratory or other knowledge commons (Hess & Ostrom, 2007).
Another major way to bring economic value into a common involves search, which is
the primary way in which information is brought into commons. Philosophical
contemplation, scientific research, artistic creation and ordinary information gathering
from news reporting to archival research are all important forms of search, as are some
types of religious activity, not merely theological research but also pilgrimages, retreats,
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and other quests for more profound religious experience, and some types of (amateur)
athletic activity and personal training.
Because of the characteristics of action, information and meaning, time is a key to
economic measurement in the commons. It is also problematic. Commons are organized in
elastic time-space units which can be called events. Sets of related events to which
meanings are attached can be called situations (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, 571-575).
Events and situations are not physical; they are socially defined; Rational actors in the
commons know when a situation has begun and when it ends. Thus it is, for instance, that a
million people can simultaneously gather on the streets of Rio, Miami or New Orleans for a
Latin American-style carnival and thousands of people will simultaneously know that it is
time to leave the athletic arena or stadium "when the gun goes off." The temporal and
spatial elasticity of situations, however, has proven to be one of the greatest stumbling
blocks for conventional economic measurement of services in general, and common goods
in particular.
The elasticity of situations is evident in many coproduced acts. Some common goods
are produced) by actors in the commons at one time, but only attain value when they are
learned by others at another time. This is commonly true, for example, of research
results. The concept of a complex act, composed of a series of discrete but related, acts is
useful in such cases. G.H. Mead’s (1937) four-part division of social acts is useful in thinking
through: Impulse, Perception, Manipulation and Consummation. Although separated in
time, the presentation of research findings and their use in the design of further
experiments by the same team are often part of the same complex acts.
The social acts of producing common goods also require an alternative to conventional
economic individualism. Coproduced social action, whether baptisms and weddings
ceremonies, parades and festivals, initiation rites, scientific conferences and amateur
athletic competitions are only possible as collective actions by persons co-present with one
another. (If this is not immediately clear, try marrying yourself or conduct your own
funeral!)
Note: An insight related to this that came late to the theory is that organized, collective
voluntary action is not just a matter of associations. Also important are assemblies –
gatherings together in a shared location: Ceremonies, festivals, parades, conferences and
meetings and amateur athletic events (for which we have many names - meets,
tournaments, competitions, and others) as well as religious gatherings as diverse as church
services and pilgrimages (like the annual haj) all include examples of such assemblies.
The fact that, in modern culture many (perhaps most) types of voluntary action can also
be pursued commercially offers interesting evidence of the existence of multiple sectors.
We can see this with reference to Figure 1 above: A professional sporting event is a private
good, while a ticketed intercollegiate sporting event (e.g., football, basketball or other
“revenue sports) is a toll good, and a club sport event for which no admission is charged is
a common good. Examples of comparable athletic public goods are few and far between.
In an open society the borders between the commons and the market are open and
permeable and economic actors are often free to move back and forth. Important in this
regard is the awareness of participants: Rational actors who move from toll charging
10

nonprofit “firms” to commercial activity or to common goods producing situations will be
aware of their changing circumstances – as will their associates .
The application of the perfect knowledge assumption to the commons has several
interesting implications. For example, it provides a rational basis for "membership" and
legitimacy in the commons. Artists, scientists, philanthropists, amateur athletes and others
engaged in common goods production who have "gone commercial", are a well-known and
recognized phenomenon in all areas of voluntary action. In this vein, rational actors
engaged in acts of common good will know that they are acting outside of markets,
households and the state and motivated by ends other than profit.
In the case of the commons, "ends other than profit" (or, more precisely, common
goods) are a condition of admission and the basis for continued participation in the
commons. Assuming a self-interested posture seeking personal gain at any point
immediately takes a consistent, rational actor out of the commons. Thus, a scientist guilty
of fabricating data for profit or career advancement may suffer various forms of removal
from that particular commons, including publicity, sanctions, expulsion from an
organization, or dismissal from an appointment or position. Defrocking, excommunication,
suspension and probation are other forms of such removals.
Coproductions are of at least two general types: Discourse is the use of complex verbal
symbols to assert things through a process of successive understanding and the
aggregation of separate meanings (Langer, p. 96). Much of the action of the commons
involves talking, conversation and social interaction (including written communication). A
second type of coproduction can be termed presentation. (Langer, p. 271) It involves the
representation or dramatization of complex images, symbols, and other types of 'complex'
meanings to those present in the situation. This category would include most forms of
religious ritual and many forms of 'pure' artistic and scientific productions, as well as
scientific meetings and professional conferences. Amateur athletic events are presentations
with a large meaning component(rules, techniques, etc.) and small, but highly significant
information content (who won, big plays, etc.). Both types of coproduction are economic
dramas--complex social acts involving pluralities of persons and incorporating a range of
established and interdependent role definitions, sometimes mistakenly called "divisions of
labor".
Note: In later statements of the theory, four types of performances involved in
coproduction of common goods are identified: These are termed benefactories, in which the
common goods produced are benefits to individuals and groups; performatories, which
produce artistic, musical or other performances, including parades and festivals;
celebratoria, which produce celebrations like patriotic observances, birthdays, religious
holidays; and moeuratoria, like non-governmental standard setting organizations,
accrediting bodies which produce moeurs (norms, mores, values, rules, standards and
practices). This latter term comes from Alexis de Tocqueville’s lesser known book, The Old
Regime and the Revolution.
Important economic roles in the commons, for example, include patrons, who obtain or
provide material and symbolic resources. Institutions of patronage and other features of
the commons can be found coexisting with markets in most of the worlds historical and
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contemporary cultures including Ancient Greece and Rome, medieval Europe, Indoamerica,
and the major cultures of Asia and the Middle East. (Finlay, 1974; James, 1987;)
In commons, patrons are not just those who give money, but also those who give other
meanings. The benefactor and the composer of sacred music thus share a common status as
patrons. Patrons typically operate from a complex of motives and derive a range of
economic and noneconomic value from their acts. Also, there are the clients, audiences and
publics who are the objects of the economic dramas of the commons. In between are the
agents and performers who enact dramas of common goods. In later versions of the theory,
notably Lohmann (2015), these patrons and donors, intermediaries and clients and said to
constitute the characteristic triadic exchange of commons goods production, termed the
philanthropod. Such exchanges are said to constitute the organization of common goods
production and are characterized by 1) voluntary participation; 2) shared purposes or
mission; and 3) shared or common pool resources. Two additional characteristics are said to
emerge from participation in commons: 4) filia, or a sense of mutuality or social capital;
and 5) daikon, or an innate sense of fairness toward one another (Lohmann, 1992).
Together, such philanthrods of patrons, agents and focused publics define commons
capable autonomy or independence; that is both of self-organization or self-constitution
and self-governance. Much of common goods economics is concerned with the appropriate
basis of support of agents and performers by patrons, and the nondistribution clause of
nonprofit corporate law and Hansmann's "contract failure" are important insights for
common goods theory into perceived problems. Similar assurances for various clients,
audiences and publics about the responsible behavior of agents and performers, however,
are even more problematic. The fundamental problem, however, is identifying the basis of
economic value of common goods.

Values In the Commons
It is possible, on the basis of the above, to tentatively set forth some value premises
which model at least partly, the empirical world of voluntary action. Because the
coproduction of common goods is a process of symbolic interaction rather than material
fabrication, the pattern of role assignments can be seen as the ultimate basis of the
economic value of common goods. While the study of other, noneconomic aspects of role
definition in the independent sector is relatively advanced, little attention has been given to
the manner in which actors assuming appropriate roles also initiate the complex patterns
of learning, search and technique by which economic values are created and sustained.
In fact, this process is so central, that we can speak of the role-taking theory of value as
basic to the commons. Common goods are of value to actors in the commons because they
are of value to others in the commons who are of value to them.
This leads also to what might be called the principle of economic ethnocentrism:
Because economic value arises within commons and is an inherent part of larger clusters of
information and meaning, evaluation of common goods must occur within the commons on
the basis of those values which arise there. It is not reasonable or consistent to take values
and standards from another context and superimpose them upon groups operating in the
commons. This ethnocentric principle is greatly threatened by present trends in nonprofit
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economics, in which the moeurs of one common – professional economists – are being
inappropriately imposed upon a wide range of other commons in the name of scientific
neutrality and objectivity.
An unexpected corollary of the perfect knowledge assumption above is the affluence
assumption of self-interest operative in the commons, which can be stated thus: Based
upon widely articulated standards by Adam Smith, Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas,
among others, it is reasonable to assume that only individuals who have currently met their
basic needs for survival and reproduction (e.g., those who are not facing imminent
starvation or threat of death) will enter or remain in the commons. Consistently rational
participants in the commons whose basic needs have been met in this baseline sense will,
as a result, have no rational basis to prefer pursuit of personal gain or profit over other
objectives. If they chose to do so as a discretionary act, they violate the most fundamental
moeurs of participation and necessarily remove themselves from the moral authority of the
commons. This is consistent with the nondistribution clause found in all nonprofit
corporation statutes, and its associated legal and ethical traditions. If they continue to
nominally participate in common with others they do so inauthentically.
An equally important corollary is that profit maximization as a criterion or standard of
rational action is inoperative in the commons. Authentic actors who have not entered or
remain in the commons under false pretense will simply have no utility to calculate or to
maximize. This non-calculation posture has both a theoretical and a methodological
dimension. See Boettke & Prychitko [2005] for further discussion of this point. This is a
result both of the affluence assumption and the formal, content-empty status of utility in
modern economic theory. Since Edgeworth, economists have held that utility is a formal
concept without subjective meaning--a construct of market behavior, devoid of any of the
earlier 'subjective' connotations of happiness or pleasure; possessed of no meaning beyond
its operational definition. To the extent that utility is a purely formal characteristic of
market behavior, then actors in situations explicitly defined as nonmarket and nonprofit
can hardly be expected to be capable of calculating utility.
Can a nonutilitarian economics exist without either maximization or utility? How is it
possible to summarize the diverse values and ends of actors in commons without resort to
these concepts? First, the possibility must be acknowledged that, indeed, there may be no
single universal standard to summarize motives and ends in commons even though in the
western tradition, terms like happiness, pleasure, actualization, satiation, welfare, health
and utility are all commonly used for this purpose.
Steinberg, for one, is forthrightly skeptical about whether there can be a general,
formal, theoretical objective in the commons. He says: "Although the lack of a profit motive
allows nonprofits to provide needed social services in a trustworthy fashion, it also fosters
inefficiency. But there can be no monolithic theory of nonprofit behavior, for the forces of
competition and regulation are paramount--the functioning of each non-profit organization
depends on the level of competition by government, for-profit firms, and other nonprofits"
(Steinberg, 1987, p. 134).
Whether or not there is such a universal standard, however, for at least some common
goods, rational choice appears to be guided by a nonutilitarian criterion which has been
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called satisfaction. An alternative is said to be satisfactory if: 1) there exists a set of agreedupon criteria that describe minimally satisfactory alternatives; and 2) the alternative in
question is agreed to meet or exceed all of these criteria in the view of the decision-makers.
(March and Simon, 1958. p.140) Note that the first of these criteria conforms closely to a
meaning as noted above, while determination of the second would introduce new
information into the situation.
Satisfaction, in this sense, is not a utilitarian counting principle, and not to be confused
with anything like a utilitarian pleasure-pain calculus. It is, instead, itself an act; an
observable moment or event in the interaction of members of the commons. Thus,
satisfaction is attained when search is suspended and technique and attention are shifted
elsewhere. Exactly this criterion may be observed in the governance of many associations.
One suspects that this "attention shift" is such a universally observable phenomenon that it
is simply taken for granted by most observers and participants in commons. Simon and
March (1958) and Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) are among the observers who have
noted aspects of its significance.
In the commons, choice seldom involves exact calculation or precise predictions.
Instead, when consensus is reached that an agreed upon satisfactory objective has been
realized, discourse simply shifts to another topic. Such satisfaction is the primary criterion
of rational choice in the commons, and governs economic decisions there as well. By itself,
however, satisfaction only operates as a "termination rule", telling us when it is rational to
end planning and pre-decision discussion. It says nothing about the distributive rationality
of common goods which may occur as a result. However, satisfaction often occurs
concurrently with another fundamental principle of distribution in the commons. That
criterion is proportion, and occurs in a situation when no rational actor with standing to do
so will act to gain additional resources except from endowments of uncommitted
resources. In the commons, proportion is almost always a preferred alternative to Pareto
optimality for settling issues of distribution. The criterion of Pareto optimality, which is
often also referred to as an "efficiency" measure, suggests that a decision is optimal if no
one loses and at least one person gains. This standard, although sometimes uncritically
embraced, has never lacked for critics. For example, Sen says "there is a danger in being
exclusively concerned with Pareto-optimality. An economy can be optimal in this sense
even when some people are rolling in luxury and others are near starvation as long as the
starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich. If
preventing the burning of Rome would have made Emperor Nero feel worse off, then
letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto-optimal. In short, a society or economy can
be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting." (p. 22) Taken together, these criteria
offer the beginning of an economic value theory appropriate to the analysis of common
goods. Thus, it would appear that analysis of real allocations of common goods is primarily
a logical, rather than a calculative, process.
Thus, much of the apparatus of economic analysis has little to offer the study of
common goods. Not only does the isomorphism of the conventional economic production
model not apply, as has been suggested. One seldom finds actual actors in the commons,
past or present, engaged in detailed mathematical analysis of their alternatives. Thus, there
are real and important indications that common goods economics must, in fact, be
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nonquantitative. It could be argued, for example, that economics of common goods is, most
appropriately seen as a branch of interdisciplinary collective choice theory. If so, the
methods of modern symbolic logic may be more suitable than calculus and indifference
curves as a basis of analysis of common goods.

Conclusion
It is possible to identify a rational choice model which bears some resemblance to
actual nonprofit settings and identifies a set of standards and criteria for evaluating
choices in those settings. Common goods, or endowment theory appears to offer a
way to approach the allocation of resources in the nonprofit sector which respects
the integrity of voluntary action without inappropriately reducing such action to the
categories of the market place. Moreover, it is highly probable that many of the
most interesting and provocative findings of nonprofit economics can be
incorporated and also stated positively in endowment theory.
Regardless, the economics of the voluntary sector need not be treated exclusively
as a series of negations. Positive statements can be made about collective action in
the commons, just as they can about economic action in the market, state and
household. The most fundamental of these is that actors in the commons need not
be held to the standards of buyers and sellers in order for their behavior to be
treated as economically rational. To do so is to fall victim to the limits of the same
inappropriate classification whereby lettuce is nonanimal.
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